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When one compares the recent literature
on military policy to that which dominated
in the West until four or five years ago, a
striking change is clearly discernible. Be-
yond the fact that there is much more of
it now than there was in either the pre- or
post-World War II periods, there is also the
impressive increase in sophistication. One
is tempted to attribute this newly-found
sophistication (which I will define in a mo-
ment) to the entrance of academics into a
field once the near-exclusive domain of the
military officer and the occasional military
historian. To be sure, these pioneers have
been joined-if not outnumbered and sub-
merged-by physicists, logicians, operations
analysts, mathematicians, sociologists, polit-
ical scientists, psychologists, etc., but the
question then becomes one of identifying
the factors which brought all of these new-
comers to a once-sacred domain. Perhaps
it is best explained as a response to the
urgency generated by the terrifying ad-
vances in weapons technology, or the sense
of guilt experienced by those of us who
have helped to create either the weapons
themselves or the policies which made the
weapons nearly inevitable. Or, it may be
that governments and foundations, in their
belated recognition that weapons are inde-
pendent as well as dependent variables in
inter-nation relations,l have provided enough
incentives to lure us from other and less
remunerative (financial or approbative) en-
deavors to this intellectually fascinating and
socially crucial aspect of the twentieth cen-
tury world.
Whatever the explanation, academics have
moved into the military policy field, and
have brought to it a degree of subtlety,
sophistication, and intellectual rigor that was
long overdue. Two of the more recent mani-
festations of this newer approach are those
emanating from the 1960 Summer Study on
Arms Control, financed by the Twentieth
1Elsewhere (12) I took great pains to make
this particular point, yet the issue has never
been joined; rather it has been ignored, which is
perhaps the most effective way of getting on
with the job.
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Century Fund. These are Strategy and
Arms Control, authored by Thomas Schel-
ling and Morton Halperin (11), and Arms
Reduction: Program and Issues, edited by
David Frisch (5). Using these two studies
as our point of departure, let us try to iden-
tify the ways in which strategic thinking
seems to have changed over the past half-
decade.
From Preponderence to Deterrence
The most obvious shift has been in terms
of the articulated objectives of a nation’s
military policies. Whereas the old school
thought primarily in terms of winning wars,
the new focuses primarily on preventing
them. This is not to say that the earlier
purpose was to bring on, and then win, one
war after another; the gap between political
purpose and strategic doctrine was seldom
that great. As a matter of fact, Flavius
Vegetius-as far back as 385 A.D.-advised
his Roman Emperors &dquo;si vis pacem, para
bellum&dquo;; if you want peace, prepare for
war.2 But the relationship was cruder; the
way to prevent war, or to gain political
victories, or to prevent political retreats, was
to have the capacity and the will to win a
military victory. In other words, you de-
terred and influenced the adversary by
threatening him with military defeat, and
nothing less. Admittedly, it could be defeat
in a war limited in space or in time or in
forces committed, but it was nevertheless
military defeat which you wanted him to
contemplate.
And out of this emphasis on promising or
gaining victory came a rather undifferen-
tiated view of weapons technology. To be
sure, we had our controversies over the
sword versus the crossbow, breech-loading
versus muzzle-loading artillery, surface ver-
sus submersible warships, airpower versus
landpower, and so on, but the prime focus
was on quantitative and qualitative supe-
riority. More specifically-and this is the
significant distinction-there was almost no
conscious differentiation between weapons
that were designed to deter and those de-
signed to defeat.3 3
Today’s military specialists have, on the
other hand, become thoroughly engrossed in
this distinction, and have, as a result, helped
to redress the great disparity between polit-
ical purpose and military doctrine which
the new technology has nearly obliterated.
The two studies under review here, espe-
cially that by Schelling and Halperin, point
up this concern in a most dramatic fashion,
though neither is by any means the first to
reveal and develop this new sophistication.4
Looking at Strategy and Arms Control
first-since it best typifies what I would
call the &dquo;sophisticated deterrence&dquo; ap-
proach-what are the major assumptions
and predictions which emerge?
The most unorthodox assumption, in
terms of the traditional thinking, is that one
must and can collaborate with the adversary.
Proceeding from the premise that inter-
nation conflict is not, and should not be
regarded as, a pure zero-sum relationship,
Schelling reminds us that even between
2 Similarly, students of World War II are fond
of reminding us that one of the key causes of
that war was the military weakness of the Allies.
3 This is not to ignore the nineteenth and
early twentieth century concern between offen-
sive and defensive weapons, though this dis-
tinction preoccupied disarmament negotiators
and peace movement leaders more than it did
the professional strategists.
4 If, in passing, I seem to suggest that Schell-
ing’s contribution here is "old hat," it is mainly
because he has written so intelligently, persua-
sively, and widely in the past few years; I would
contend that almost no serious scholar in the
field today has escaped his valuable influence.
See, inter alia, (9) and (10).
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enemies there is always a modicum of co-
operation. This is inevitable if both players
realize that certain outcomes of the rivalry
can be mutually advantageous as well as
mutually catastrophic. The trouble is that
heretofore, and still among many political
and military leaders on all sides, the dom-
inant belief was that any outcome advan-
tageous to one must be disadvantageous to
the other, and that a &dquo;win&dquo; for one was
always a &dquo;loss&dquo; for the other. It must be
admitted that the anarchic character of the
international system leads almost inevitably
to such a view, but even in the jungle there
is room for some measure of cooperative and
collaborative behavior.
From this key assumption, the new mili-
tary theorists usually move to a strategy of
what is known as finite or minimum deter-
rence. In its restricted sense (i.e., omitting
the arms control aspects for the moment)
this approach, or school, calls for a non-
provocative set of military capabilities and
doctrines. More particularly, both sides are
admonished to opt for a strike-back or sec-
ond-strike force only, and to eschew any-
thing suggestive of a first-strike intent. In
targeting terms, this means that one relies
on a counter-city or counter-industry doc-
trine, rather than one directed at the adver-
sary’s launch sites, airfields, naval vessels,
etc. And in timing terms, it means that one
does not strike until certain that the other
has struck first, or is about to.5 In order to
adhere to these self-denying and stabilizing
ordinances, one must create an &dquo;invulner-
able&dquo; retaliatory capability. Having achieved
this, one may await any assault from the
other with relative strategic impunity, know-
ing that his cities and factories and trans-
port will be obliterated by the inevitable
retaliatory blow.
A central notion in this doctrine is that
of the &dquo;exchange ratio&dquo;: how many of what
types of weapon are required to retain a cer-
tain retaliatory capability after having been
attacked by a predicted quantity and type
of first-strike forces. This exchange ratio is,
of course, a key variable in the degree of
deterrence (and hence stability) one can
rely upon generating. If the deterrer-and
for our sophisticated strategists, there is a
greater tendency to admit the symmetry of
the relationship-is able to anticipate pre-
serving an impressive strike-back force, and
if the would-be attacker makes a similar
estimate, then it is postulated that no attack
will take place. Since the considerations
affecting the exchange ratio and relative
vulnerability have been widely discussed
elsewhere, I will not go into these matters
in any detail. Rather, it might be useful to
look at those requirements for stabilized
deterrence which raise the most serious
doubts as to the efficacy of this approach
to war-prevention.
The first is in the area of weapons tech-
nology, and here we observe that the stand-
off is highly reliant on either a prevention or
retardation of breakthrough, or on the more
or less simultaneous breakthrough on each
side. For example, if either side were to de-
velop and produce an anti-missile device
with a reliability of about fifty per cent,
the stipulated exchange ratio would be
badly shattered. Or, if a major breakthrough
in submarine detection or mobile missile de-
tection were to occur (and the latter be-
comes more likely as surveillance satellites
are improved), the number of retaliatory
weapons surviving an opening strike would
be dramatically reduced. Or, if either side
5 Finite deterrers are compelled to hedge
somewhat on this point because there is no such
thing as invulnerability; there are only varying
degrees of vulnerability to contemporary weap-
ons. Hence much of the debate over pre-
emption, or striking before the other side does,
but on the basis of intelligence which indicates
his intention or plan to do so.
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can produce a fission-less, nearly &dquo;clean&dquo;
megaton warhead, it could afford to use an
unlimited saturation attack designed to &dquo;dig
up&dquo; and destroy the enemy’s hardened or
concealed or mobile retaliatory force with
little fear of radioactive backlash.
The second major difficulty lies in the
perceptual atmosphere which the traditional
expectation of war and the new technology
combine to create. As Schelling and Hal-
perin see it, the principal danger of pre-
meditated attack, as with pre-emptive attack,
is &dquo;the vulnerability of either side’s retalia-
tory forces to an attack by the other&dquo; (p. 11).
But this is incomplete; there is an infinite
regression of expectations at work, so that
each fears that the other might seek to ex-
ploit his vulnerability so as to prevent its
own vulnerability from being exploited, etc.
It is, as he pointed out several years ago, the
reciprocal fear that the second will fear the
first’s attack, and hence decide to strike first,
and so on (9, 10).
From the point of view of the stable de-
terrer, this problem is largely solved by
achieving mutual invulnerability, but as al-
ready suggested, this is never more than
partially achievable, and it is continually
susceptible to technological upset.
Moreover, even the expectation of vulner-
ability or upset can serve to trigger the
opening blow. And it is here that Schelling
makes-and has made frequently in the
past-his major contribution. If each side
can behave in such a way as to convey to
the other that his military intentions are
purely retaliatory, then he may well reduce
the reciprocal temptation to strike first.
Such conveyance depends upon the kinds
of weapons one acquires, the manner of
their deployment, and the nature of one’s
decisional process and, from Schelling’s
point of view, the key problem is to let the
adversary know as much as possible about
these variables as is necessary to assure him
that you have no intention of &dquo;going first.&dquo;
As promising as such tacit communica-
tion may be, it still is largely vitiated by the
fact that there is no such thing as a purely
retaliatory weapon. Every strike-back sys-
tem has powerful strike-first characteristics,
and as a result there must always remain a
marked degree of reciprocal fear, as long
as any weapons remain.
Again, our authors are not oblivious to
these considerations, but many of their con-
clusions suggest a greater discounting of
them than this reviewer would think to be
consonant with the strategic facts of life. On
the other hand, this may be why Schelling
devotes more of his attention to some of the
problems of formal arms control in this
volume than he has in the past. But since
Strategy and Arms Control gives far less
attention to the concrete aspects of this ap-
proach than does the companion book by
Frisch, et al., I will reserve my comments
on these for later paragraphs.
My major criticism of the Schelling and
Halperin study is that it is at great pains to
argue against weapons reduction or elimina-
tion as the path to a stable military environ-
ment. Although one cannot find a direct
statement to the effect that these approaches
are definitely less satisfactory than the drive
for invulnerability, etc., there is a constant
needling of those whose confidence in stable
deterrence is less than the authors’. For
example, &dquo;primitive war is still possible, re-
armament is possible; ... nor is primitive
warfare necessarily a very attractive alterna-
tive to the more modem type&dquo; (p. 60). Or,
&dquo;conflict of interest will occur, potential
force will always be at hand, and the mili-
tary technology ... will not have been
erased from the records and men’s mem-
ories&dquo; (p. 61). They claim to be treating
&dquo;as an open question&dquo; whether the &dquo;most
promising areas of arms control involve re-
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ductions in certain kinds of military force&dquo;
etc. (p. 2), but the answer is pretty well
foreclosed throughout. Thus, Strategy and
Arms Control, for all its usefulness and
sophistication, is still too conservative to
offer more than a limited and temporary
reduction of the high probability of nuclear-
missile cataclysm; it still relies on a capri-
cious technology and a pair of adversaries
living under a tremendous temptation to
destroy the other’s capacity to destroy one’s
self
Exploiting Achieved Stability
For those of us who have only a limited
degree of confidence in the enduring stabil-
ity of a stand-off based on less vulnerable
weapons and less threatening postures, is
there a range of intermediate steps which
may carry us a step or two further toward
the goal of a warless world?7 The editor
and most of the contributors to Arms Reduc-
tion : Program and Issues seem to think so,
and this is the main difference between the
two books under review. While Schelling
and Halperin discuss a wide range of arms
control issues in the abstract, they get down
to only a handful of the practical and con-
crete steps of arms reduction. They are
emphasizing an attitude, while Frisch et al.,
choose to address themselves to certain spe-
cific problems that are bound to arise if the
major powers ever attempt to negotiate and
execute the reduction or elimination of cer-
tain segments of their national arsenals. The
scope and detail of this latter volume defies
adequate treatment in this limited space,
but I would like to focus on the central
paper-which is a rather concrete proposal
by Louis Sohn and the editor. Let me first
make brief mention of several of the other
papers in the book.
The introductory chapter by Bernard Feld
is a highly intelligent discussion of the issues
which arose in the course of the Summer
Study, and while I might quarrel with a
point or two, I wholly concur in his con-
clusion that &dquo;limited stabilized deterrence
could provide the interim stability which
would permit a really drastic reversal of
present armament trends ... it could set
the stage for ... more long-range solutions
to the problem of how to settle conflicts
without resorting to war&dquo; (p. 9). The same
general theme is reiterated in an excellent
essay by John Phelps (like Feld, a physi-
cist), &dquo;On the Role of Stabilized Deterrence.&dquo;
After reminding us of the hazards and im-
permanencies of such a state of affairs, he
nevertheless concludes that &dquo;these [stabil-
izing] actions may have a decisive catalyzing
effect on the processes of formal negotia-
tion toward disarmament....&dquo; (p 90).
A similar conclusion is also reached by
Dalimil Kybal in a chapter of the same title
(&dquo;On&dquo; is omitted), though the development
of his argument would not have forecast it.
If, in a &dquo;situation of mutual deterrence, moti-
vations for both arms race and surprise at-
tack cease to exist on both sides,&dquo; and if in-
vulnerability and powerful retaliatory forces
&dquo;would serve to perpetuate the nuclear stale-
mate and preserve the non-aggressive at-
6 Nor does the stable deterrence approach
take adequate account of the destabilizing effect
of new players being brought into the environ-
ment. The problem is recognized, but hardly
resolved. I should also add that one’s confidence
in the nuclear "umbrella" must diminish when
one considers that the side which is both anti-
status quo and more inclined toward risk-taking
may nevertheless threaten to upset the balance
and thereby gain significant political concessions.
7 It should hardly be necessary, but let me
emphasize that a warless world is not necessarily
a conflictless world. Many critics of the peace
movement (whatever that includes) waste a lot
of energy alleging a na&iuml;vet&eacute; and utopianism
which, on investigation, seldom exists.
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mosphere&dquo; (p. 137), why worry about arms
reduction or elimination?
A more limited view, and one similar to
that of Schelling, is in Frank Bothwell’s plea
for American initiative in arms control. He
makes the standard (and for this reviewer,
compelling) case for finite deterrence as
opposed to the pre-emptive, counter-force
strategies. Not only does he find the latter
doctrine &dquo;highly destabilizing&dquo; and &dquo;tech-
nically and practically impossible,&dquo; but also
a dangerous diversion of our intellectual and
material resources (p. 17). Throughout, his
emphasis is on those strategic measures we
can undertake unilaterally in trying to build
maximum stability into the stand-off.
Then there are three general papers of an
allegedly &dquo;supporting&dquo; nature. In the first
of his two, Arthur Barber reiterates the
standard (and again compelling) argument
against NATO reliance on massive nuclear
forces based on fixed and vulnerable sites.
He reminds us (without mentioning names)
that Thor and Jupiter sites in Europe are
&dquo;provocative in peace and useless in war&dquo;
(p. 62), but endorses continuous airborne
alert (a sop to the Air Force?). Barber’s
main thrust is that Europe’s defense should
rest mainly on conventional weapons, and
that this could be achieved even while
negotiating atom-free zones in the area. His
second paper expands on the role of con-
ventional forces and offers some useful no-
tions regarding their role in a United Na-
tions police force. The third paper is that
of Arthur Smithies, a Harvard economist,
who makes a brief but very persuasive case
for the usefulness and acceptability of re-
gional arms limitation applied to sub-Sahara
Africa.
Next, there are three papers of a rela-
tively technical nature. An ingenious one
by Marvin Kalkstein (co-author of [3]) and
Winthrop Smith devises a means of esti-
mating national nuclear stockpiles, and ends
up with the &dquo;guess&dquo; that the U.S. has pro-
duced 40-50 metric tons of plutonium and
300-350 of uranium-235. The significance
of being able to make such a calculation to
the reliability of a reduction of nuclear
stockpiles cannot be overemphasized. As a
matter of fact, in a second paper by Kalk-
stein, he points out that &dquo;the more accurate
this determination is, the smaller will be
the possible size of any illegal stockpile&dquo;
(p. 99). He concludes here that inspection
for both the production of new stocks and
the existence and activation of present stocks
is relatively feasible, emphasizing that the
purpose would probably be to inspect &dquo;for
intent,&dquo; with a &dquo;reasonable chance of un-
covering violations&dquo; (p. 102). While the
two papers just mentioned seem to bear
out technical conclusions which have been
widely accepted, the one on missile produc-
tion inspection by Phelps raises some minor
questions. Noting that &dquo;the capabilities of
record inspection for this task seem partic-
ularly disappointing,&dquo; he argues that &dquo;phys-
ical surveillance of known missile component
plants will need to be very close&dquo; (p. 120).
This departs somewhat from the impression
left by Feld et al. (4) and by Melman (7).
However, there is in all three sources a gen-
eral conviction that missile production is
highly inspectable, providing a combination
of techniques is employed. And as Phelps
points out, when an inspectorate &dquo;can draw
information from a variety of sources and
techniques, and if the population of the host
country can be induced to cooperate with it,
clandestine missile production and many
other things can very probably be pre-
vented&dquo; (p. 122).
Arms Reduction: Some First Steps
In these few remaining paragraphs, let
me return to the general characteristics of
the proposals made by Sohn and Frisch.
Noting the incompatibility between the con-
317
temporary positions of the U.S.S.R. and the
Western powers regarding the relationship
between the diminution of national weapons
and the creation of inspection and enforce-
ment arrangements, the authors seek a pos-
sible compromise which need not threaten-
and may well enhance-the security con-
cerns of both sides. Basically, the proposed
first stage (of about three years’ duration)
toward ultimate comprehensive disarma-
ment involves: (a) creation and gradual
development of the Control Organization;
(b) gradual and phased reduction of IRBM
and ICBM forces down to a level of 100-200
on each side; (c) gradual and phased re-
duction of nuclear stocks down to a level
of 2-4 metric tons, with conversion of bal-
ance ; (d) prohibition on the testing of
missiles and anti-missile devices, and super-
vision of space probes, etc.; (e) sharp reduc-
tion in permitted production of all delivery
systems; (f) creation of partially demili-
tarized zones in Europe and Asia, and grad-
ual withdrawal of all nuclear-missile forces
from these zones; (g) gradual reduction in
military airbases and local and foreign
armed forces in these zones; (h) gradual
elimination of all strategic weapons from
Africa and a partial ban on export of con-
ventional weapons to the area; (i) gradual
reduction of major power armed forces to
1.4 million each; and (j) an immediate ban
on production of BCR weapons, with grad-
ual destruction of existing stocks.
If the Control Organization were working
effectively, and if all the measures indicated
had been carried out during this three-year
period, the plan would use the next two
years or so to consolidate these very sweep-
ing arrangements. In the third and final
phase-of five to seven years’ duration, Sohn
and Frisch would have a further reduction
of both nuclear-missile and conventional
forces down to levels limited to &dquo;militia
(police) forces required for the purpose of
maintaining internal order and to con-
tingents of the international peace force&dquo;
(p. 37). To those who suggest this is too
radical for acceptance by the West, I would
point out how closely this parallels recent
Western proposals, and to those who fear
the Soviet would not accept the degree of
inspection required, let me refer to Sohn’s
rather ingenious supporting paper &dquo;Phasing
of Arms Reduction: The Territorial Method.&dquo;
This scheme has two key aspects. Firstly,
&dquo;each cut in armaments would be accom-
panied by an extension of control to a speci-
fied part of a nation’s territory, the size of
the controlled territory growing in propor-
tion to the amount of the arms reduction&dquo;
(p. 124). Secondly, each signatory power
would divide its territory into as many re-
gions as there are time periods in the arms
reduction schedule. Before the first period,
each would provide the Control Organiza-
tion with a list of all the facilities (plants,
depots, test sites, etc.) subject to inspection,
broken down by regions. As in certain other
&dquo;games of skill,&dquo; the host nation may divide
and allocate as it desires, but cannot know
in advance which region will be inspected
during which phase. (Though Sohn leaves
this choice to the inspectorate, I would leave
it to a roulette wheel or other random
device.)
An ingenious variation on this scheme is
proposed in an adjoining paper by Joseph
Salerno (who, with Frisch, presents a use-
ful critique of the Sohn-Frisch plans). He
is also concerned with finding a minimum
degree of inspection consonant with accept-
able probabilities of detection. In effect, he
has each power declaring its own levels and
estimating what the other has in each cate-
gory, and then permitting inspection to
ascertain the accuracy of the allegation. If
the estimate is lower than the levels sub-
sequently found to exist, the inspected na-
tion is arbitrarily assumed to have some
318
proportionally higher level and must sur-
render a greater number of weapons during
that period. But if the estimate made by
the other side is higher than that found, then
the estimating nation is conversely penal-
ized. Essentially, the plan assumes that
penalties for either inaccurate declarations
or overly suspicious estimates will impel
each side toward honesty and objectivity in
reporting one’s own forces and estimating
those of the other side. A second essential
provision-which is treated too briefly and
casually-is for weapons to be turned over
to U.N. depots within the host countries,
rather than being scrapped.
Space prohibits any detailed critique of
either the arms reduction program or the
various inspection schemes, but certain gen-
eral observations seem to be in order. To
my way of thinking, these are extremely
useful exercises. Whether one can predict
their being adopted in the near future is
less relevant than the fact that they com-
pel the student-and hopefully, the policy-
maker-on all sides to get down to the
very sensitive and specific roadblocks to dis-
armament. They also make more meaning-
ful the more general debate as to whether
disarmament does or does not present a use-
ful avenue to the sort of enduring stability
which all seem to desire.8 More specifically,
such proposals enable us to recognize, and
perhaps alter, the straw man constructed
by those who fear going much beyond in-
formal arrangements of stabilized deter-
rence. Obviously a disarmed world would
be an unstable world, but critics of multi-
lateral and comprehensive disarmament fail
to recognize-and advocates fail to sug-
gest-that there is no intention of seeking
a disarmed world.9 9 Rather, the goal is a
world in which the sovereign nations are
more or less disarmed, but in which the
international &dquo;government&dquo; is very much
armed, albeit with conventional weapons
only.10 The problem is not so much the
presence or absence of arms, but their pos-
session and control. Every social system
requires some measure of centralized coer-
cion, and the global one is clearly no
exception.
Summary
In conclusion, these two studies must be
welcomed as valuable additions to a body of
literature which is growing not only in quan-
tity but in rigor, sophistication, and tech-
nical expertise. The Schelling and Halperin
book represents an effective capstone to the
developing doctrines of finite, stable deter-
rence in a bipolar world. As a result of this
and prior work by the senior author,&dquo; my
hope would be that we need no longer back-
track over the familiar ground. By now, it
should hardly be necessary to reiterate that
invulnerable weapons are less provocative
than vulnerable ones, that certain secrets are
better &dquo;leaked&dquo; to the adversary, and that
intentions and expectations are as important
as capabilities; Strategy and Arms Control
8 By stability, I do not mean a freezing of the
economic, social, or political status quo; refer-
ence rather is to the sort of military stability
which appreciably diminishes the probability of
international war.
9 The blame in this case is partly Sohn’s, in-
asmuch as the build-up of U.N. forces so co-
gently proposed in World Peace through World
Law (2) is barely discussed in either of his
papers here.
10 Although I speak only for myself here, I
would doubt that many serious proponents of
disarmament would prefer either an unarmed
or an overarmed international control organiza-
tion. My own present approach is spelled out
in some detail in a forthcoming study (13).
11 The junior author, Halperin, has already
published an excellent analysis of certain limited
war problems, has collaborated on a first-rate
study of the nuclear test ban issue (with Donald
Brennan), and is currently completing a fuller,
theoretical dissertation on limited war.
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helps provide the basis for moving ahead in
our thinking.
What makes these two studies a valuable
combination is that Arms Reduction: Pro-
gram and Issues, despite some inevitable
overlap, points the way to the next phase
in the growth of sophisticated strategic anal-
ysis. It constitutes a solid link with stable
deterrence, yet is not restricted solely to
what may turn out to be the &dquo;pause that
regresses.&dquo;
What is needed now is the sort of careful,
yet imaginative, and technical, yet sweeping
analysis of the arms reduction problem that
we have recently seen in regard to the stable
deterrence and arms control problem, and
the Frisch book is an excellent beginning.
The Twentieth Century Fund is to be con-
gratulated for mobilizing the intellect and
publishing the results bearing on this most
crucial dilemma of man’s history to date.
These are valuable contributions to an emer-
gent synthesis in the security policies of
nations.
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